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Why
Ethics Beyond the Horizon:
Regulate the Global Practice of Law?
ChristopherJ. Whelan*
ABSTRACT

This Article explores whether global self-regulationof the legal
profession is desirable. The Author explains that as global law
practice has grown over the past decade, so has the desire to
formulate global rules of professional responsibility. The
Article focuses on large law firms offering transnationallegal
services in many countries. The Author addresses whether and
for whom the aspirationto deliver core values at the global level
is desirable. He does so by comparing the rhetoricof global selfregulationwith the reality of global law practice. In reality, the
global law practice has undermined the power of nation states
because large law firm clients are powerful enough to
manipulate nation states; lawyers are not capable of
independent professional judgment because competition for
profits puts loyalty to clients at a premium; and lawyers are
capable of manipulating the rule of law to their clients'
The Author concludes that global rules of
advantage.
professional responsibility based on core values will add value
to private clients, but they will add little to the public interest.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Global law practice is part of the process of globalization.1 As it
has grown in the last decade or so, 2 so too has global professional
regulation.3 Professional services are an important element in the

1.
Thomas Friedman defined globalization "as the integration of finance,
markets, nation states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before-in a way
that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation states to reach around the world
further, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before, and in a way that is producing a
powerful backlash from those brutalised or left behind." Thomas Friedman, It's A
Small World, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Mar. 28, 1999 (News Review), at 1.
2.
An OECD survey showed that the net trade balances in respect of U.S. and
U.K. legal services was nearly two billion dollars. U.K. lawyers accounted for $830
million of that figure. Peter Goldsmith QC, Globalisationof Law-Tearing Down the
Walls, in GLOBAL LAW IN PRACTICE 139, 143 (J. Ross Harper ed., 1997). Between 1986
and 1996, U.S. exports of legal services rose from ninety-seven million dollars to $1.9
billion; imports rose over the same period from forty million dollars to $516 million.
Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the Paris Forum on TransnationalPracticefor the
Legal Profession, 18 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1999). In the year prior to Clifford Chance's
merger with Rogers & Wells and Punder Volhard Weber & Axster in 1999, 37% of the
firm's £585 million turnover came from global practice outside London; after the
merger, non-London turnover accounted for 57% of revenues. Catrin Griffiths, Legal
Eagles Swoop to Grab the Power and the Money, THE TIMES (London), Oct. 7, 2000, at
48. Of the eighty thousand solicitors in England and Wales, about three thousand
practice abroad. Christian Wisskirchen, The Policies of the Law Society of England and
Wales on Cross-BorderRegulation and Discipline Enforcement (July 14, 2000) (on file
with author).
3.
See generally Kenneth S. Klimnik, Lawyers Abroad: New Rules for Practice
in a Global Economy, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 269 (1994); INT'L BAR ASS'N, LAW WITHOUT
FRONTIERS:
A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
APPLICABLE TO THE CROss-BORDER PRACTICE OF LAW (Edwin Godfrey ed., 1995)
[hereinafter LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS]; RIGHTS, LIABILITY AND ETHICS IN
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE (Mary C. Daly & Roger J. Goebel eds., 1995); GLOBAL

LAW IN PRACTICE (J. Ross Harper ed., 1997). Examples of such regulation include the
Solicitors' Overseas Practice Rules 1990, the International Bar Association Code of
Ethics (adopted by the Law Society as the basic code for solicitors practicing outside the
jurisdiction) and the CCBE Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the European Community,
The Union Internationale des Avocats. See CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION, (1998) [hereinafter CCBE CODE], available at
httpJ/www.ccbe.org. In 1994, the American Bar Association and the Brussels Bar
agreed to the terms on which American attorneys would be permitted to practice in
Brussels. If attorneys wished to advise only on ancillary issues in Belgian law, they
had to agree to be bound by the CCBE Code of Conduct, unless it conflicted with
applicable U.S. rules; if they wished to be able to advise on Belgian law, they had to
agree to be bound by the Brussels Bar's rules of ethics, provided they were applied in
accordance with the CCBE Code principles. Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the
European Community's Legal Ethics Code Part II: Applying the CCBE Code of
Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 345, 347-48 (1993); Laurel S. Terry, A Case Study of
the Hybrid Model for FacilitatingCross-BorderLegal Practice: The Agreement between
the American Bar Association and the Brussels Bars, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1382,
1436-39 (1998). Solicitors practicing in Europe are subject to the general principles of
professional conduct of the English Law Society, the CCBE Code, the IBA's
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development of international trade, 4 and self-regulation is one of the
5
defining characteristics of a profession.
Although global law practice can take many forms, 6 this Article
focuses on those law firms-predominantly U.S. and English-that
International Code of Ethics, European law, local law and, possibly, local rules of
professional conduct. See generally, CCBE CODE, supra.
4.
Freedom to provide services and to establish businesses within the
European Community was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 V.N.T.S. 11.
More recently, multilateral trade agreements, such as GATS and NAFTA, have
included legal services within their frameworks. See infra text accompanying notes 910.
5.
See, e.g., in the United States, MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT, pmbl.
para. 9 (1998) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] (describing the connection betveen the legal
profession and law enforcement as a reason that the legal profession is self-regulated);
in England and Wales, THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON LEGAL SERVICES, 1 FINAL REPORT,
para. 3.18(d), at 30 (1979) (explaining how self-regulation allows higher standards than
otherwise could be imposed). Lawyers' professional responsibilities often are set out in
professional codes made and enforced by fellow professionals. See, e.g., MODEL CODE
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]; MODEL RULES, supra note
3; THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE BAR, CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND
WALES (1990); THE LAW SOCIETY, THE GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF
SOLIcrrORS (Nicola Taylor ed., 8th ed. 1999). Greater self-regulation implies the "rise
of professionalism;" lesser suggests a "decline." Richard L. Abel, The Rise of
Professionalism, 6 BRIT. J. L. & SOC. 82 (1979); Richard L. Abel, The Decline of
Professionalism?,49 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1986).
6.
English-speaking global law firms tend to structure themselves as one of
four organizational types: international with assets and strategies centralized at home
country headquarters, for example Lovell, White & Durrant; multidomestic with assets
and strategies located in foreign offices, for example Freshfields LLP: "Our strategy as
an international firm [means] being a leading firm in each local market." Griffiths,
supra note 2, at 48 (quoting Anthony Salz, Senior Partner of Freshfields LLP); global
with assets and strategies organized according to practice area, for example Ernst &
Young, and transnational (assets and strategies distributed to locations world-wide, for
example Baker & McKenzie. Patrick E. Mears & Carol M. Sanchez, Going Global:
How Do Law Firms Do It and What Does It Change?, 10 BUS. L. TODAY, March/April,
2001, at 32. See also, John Flood, Megalauwering in the Global Order. the Cultural,
Social and Economic Transformation of Global Legal Practice, 3 L\'r'L J. LEGAL PROF.
169, 191 (1996) (stating that while the largest global firms can sustain foreign offices
that are conversant with local law, those that fall below the top category aim to
"capture foreign clients" to either U.K. or U.S. law). Abel notes that multijurisdictional
practice could be done "from home," via modem communications, transportation and
technology. Richard L. Abel, TransnationalLaw Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L REV.
737, 761 (1994). There are also many forms of transnational law firm alliances and
networks. Id. at 747.
Global law practice also takes place within corporate legal departments and within
accounting firms. The "Big 5" accounting firms "rank among the largest law firms
worldwide." Laurel S. Terry & Clasina B. Houtman Mahoney, Future Role of Merged
Law and Accounting Firms, 41 PRiVATE INVESTMENTS ABROAD, 1998, at 7-6, 7-7. In
2000, Landwel, the law firm of PriceWaterhouseCoopers, had offices in 42 countries.
Lucinda Kemeny, Legal Eagles Spread Their Wings, SUNDAY TBIES (London), Aug. 6,
2000, (Business) at 7.
The issue of the regulation of multidisciplinary practice is also about the regulation
MDPs are "intrinsically bound up with the forces of
of global practice:
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offer transnational legal services in other countries. Anglo-American

law firms enjoy a competitive advantage in global practice due to the
dominance

of

Anglo-American

capital

markets

and

financial

institutions and of New York and English law in regulating
international financial transactions. 7 Anglo-American law firms also
have experience in mergers and acquisitions and take-overs and in
8
dealing with complex transnational transactions.

Globalization has accelerated a trend towards universal
standards of professional responsibility. The General Agreement on
Trade in Services, part of the agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization, "may serve as a basis for further development of
cross-border legal practice standards." 9
Similarly, NAFTA
"establishes a framework for evaluating and possibly changing the

cross-border regulation in the signatory countries." 10 Professional
bodies too have co-operated in the development of transnational
professional standards, possibly in recognition of a need for
harmonization, but also, perhaps, to preempt external regulation."

globalisation...."
John Malpas, American Bar Votes Down Union, THE TIMES
(London), July 25, 2000, (Law) at 17 (quoting Tony Williams of Anderson Legal,
formerly with Clifford Chance).
See generally, Detlev F. Vagts, Professional
Responsibility in TransborderPractice: Conflict and Resolution, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 677 (2000) (noting that MDPs are common in Europe while generally prohibited
in the US); Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs: Should the "No" Rule Become a New
Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 869 (1999) (examining whether the current rule prohibiting a
practicing lawyer from being a partner with, or sharing legal fees with, nonlawyers
should be replaced).
7.
Flood, supra note 6, at 172. Three-quarters of the Commercial Court
caseload in London involves non-British disputants (obviously generating much trade
for British lawyers). Andrew Boon & John Flood, Globalization of ProfessionalEthics?
The Significance of Lawyers' InternationalCodes of Conduct, 2:1 LEGAL ETHICS 29, 39
(1999). In 1989, the figure was 30%. THE TIMES (London), July 20, 1989, at 4.
8.
Carole Silver, Globalization and the U.S. Market in Legal Services Shifting Identities, 31 LAW & POLY INT'L BUS. 1093, 1095-96 (2000). Other factors, no
doubt, have played a part in this as well, such as the restriction, only recently removed,
on inter-city law firm mergers in Germany. LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note 3, at
6.
9.
Laurel S. Terry, A Case Study of the Hybrid Model for FacilitatingCrossBorder Legal Practice: The Agreement between the American Bar Association and the
Brussels Bars, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1382, 1396 (1998); GATS General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), Annex 1B to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, April 15, 1994.
10.
Terry, supra note 9, at 1399.
11.
See, e.g., Bernard L. Greer, Jr., Professional Regulation and Globalization:
Toward a Better Balance, in GLOBAL LAW IN PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 169; Mary C.
Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standardsand Rules: A New Way of Understandingthe
Differences in Perceptionsof Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1117 (1999). A Working Party on Professional Services,
established by GATS, has issued a background paper and posed questions to OECD
Member States to identify barriers to trade in legal services rooted in the countries'
regulatory and ethical regimes. Laurel S. Terry, GATS'Applicability to Transnational
Lawyering & its Potential Impact on U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers, 34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'LL. 989 (2001).
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One of the stated objectives of the Council of the Bars and Law
Societies of the European Community (CCBE), is the co-ordination
and harmonization of the practice of the legal profession.1 2 In
principle, the CCBE Code regulates the cross-border activities 13 of
over 500,000 lawyers in twenty-eight countries' 4 throughout Europe
with a population well in excess of 500,000,000. Laurel S. Terry
hoped that the CCBE Code "[would] provide the first step towards a
comprehensive code of ethical conduct for lawyers throughout the
world."' 5 John Toulmin QC, former President of the CCBE, argued
that a world-wide code could be founded on the U.S. Model Rules, the
16
Japanese Code, and the CCBE Code.
Global self-regulation may be inevitable, but is it desirable?
There are lingering doubts about any kind of self-regulation and,
indeed, about the whole idea of professionalism more generally. As
George Bernard Shaw famously put it, "[Professions] are all
conspiracies against the laity."17 Certainly, self-regulation of the
legal profession on a domestic level has been a way of protecting
lawyers from competition.1 8 At the international level, similar

12.
The CCBE Comite Consultatif des Barreaux Europeens is composed of
delegations from 28 countries comprising full members and observer members. Other
News from the CCBE, 1 CCBE GAZETTE, (CCBE, Brussels, Belgium) 2001, at 2.
13.
"Cross-border" means all professional contacts with lawyers of different
Member States of the European Community and the professional activities of the
lawyer in a Member State other than his own, whether or not he is physically present
in that Member State. CCBE CODE, supra note 3, at Rule 1.5.
14.
Acceptance of the Code is a precondition for observer status within the
CCBE; hence, it applies not only within the Member States of the European
Community and the European Economic Area, but also to countries in Central and
Eastern Europe. See generally THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS IN TE NEW EUROPE: A
HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS (Alan Tyrrell & Zahd Yaqub, eds., 2d ed. 1996). There
are thirty-four legal professions in the European Union. Id. at 1.
15.
Laurel S. Terry, An Introductionto the European Community's Legal Ethics
Code PartII: Applying the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 345, 348
(1993).
16.
John Toulmin Q.C., A Worldwide Common Code of Professional Ethics? 15
FORDHAM IN'L L.J. 673 (1991-92) cited in Boon & Flood, supra note 6, at 30 n.8.
17.
GEORGE B. SHAW, Preface on Doctorsto a Doctor's Dilemma xv (1911). In a
similar vein, John Vickers, Director-General of the Office of Fair Trading (competition
agency) recently stated that: "The professions are organised and run largely by
producers for producers, and if you have a professional body laying down restrictive
rules, there are clearly risks and small businesses may be the losers.' Wanda Kemeny,
Legal World Faces Biggest Shake-up in 700 Years, THE SUNDAY TIMES (London), Mar.
11, 2001, (Business) at 14.
18.
See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional
Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 702-06 (1981) (explaining how
the Model Rules constrain competition within the legal profession without being
ultimately protectionist); Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical
Rules?, 59 TEx. L. REv. 639, 653-67 (1981) (applying the theories of MAGAI SARFATrn
LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977), to the legal

profession in the United States).
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concerns have been expressed about professional rules: 19 "One does
not have to be too cynical to believe that the CCBE's primary
objection [to MDPs] might be its own loss of market share rather
20
than protection of clients or the public interest."
It has been argued that the function of professional codes, with
their emphasis on a public service ideal, is ideological-"masking
unpleasant institutional realities... ."21 Professional rules have been
22
used in the past to exclude "undesirables" from the profession,
including, at one time, all foreign practitioners.2 3 As professional
rules constitute "de facto lawmaking by a private group,"24 their
quality is suspect and their enforcement and effectiveness

questionable.

25

Not all proponents of enhanced professionalism and selfregulation are conspirators, monopolists, or xenophobes. 20 For them,
the public service ideal of the profession is a meaningful one. It
functions "as a noble aspiration, prompting successful attempts at
piecemeal improvement." 27 Professional rules should be adopted only
if they further public interest goals.2 8 The same goes for regulation of
global practice, in which a number of concerns have been identified.2 9

19.
See, e.g., Abel, supra note 6, at 737.
20.
Terry & Mahoney, supra note 6, at 7-14.
21.
Mark J. Osiel, Lawyers as Monopolists, Aristocrats and Entrepreneurs, 103
HARV. L. REv. 2009, 2021 (1990) (book review).
22.
See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 106-108 (1976) (discussing the
post-World War I attempts to exclude Eastern Europeans and Jews from practicing law
in the United States).
23.
Citizenship requirements were struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973). The European Court of Justice did likewise in
Case 2/74, Reyners o Belgian State, 1974 E.C.R. 631. Of course, rules that appear on
their face to be non-discriminatory-that apply to all ("indistinctly applicable" in Eurojargon)-can create barriers against foreigners. In Russia's recent bid to join the WTO,
it added a clause that legal services should be offered only by "individual
entrepreneurship" and not in any corporate form. Russia's WTO Offer Sparks Fears of
Office Closures, in LAW SOC. GAZETTE, Mar. 3, 2001.
24.
Ted Schneyer, Professionalismas Bar Politics: The Making of the Model
Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 677 (1989).
25.
Abel, supra note 18, at 639, 641-42 (questioning whether the vagueness of
the ABA rules will render them unenforceable); Harry W. Arthurs, A Global Code, 3
LEGAL ETHICS 1, 61-64 (1999).
26.
Schneyer, supra note 24, at 737 (explaining that "participants in the Model
Rules process did not understand themselves to be engaged in a public relations
charade that would legitimate the bar's tradition of self-regulation but have no
regulatory bite .. . lawyers expected the Model Rules to have real significance as a
guide to lawyers with ethical questions...
27.
Osiel, supra note 21, at 2021.
28.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 5, $1 11 (1998) (stating that "the
profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public
interest and not in furtherance of the parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar");
THE ROYAL COMM'N ON LEGAL SERvIcEs, FINAL REPORT Volume 1 30, $13.18(d) (1979)
(stating that "[a rule of conduct or practice and any restriction should stand or fall on
its capacity to protect the interests of, or to enhance the level of service to, the public").
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The development of large multinational law firms has been seen
as "leading to an erosion of ethical standards to the detriment of the
client."3 0 It has been argued that "the maintenance of strict moral
and ethical standards, and the safeguard of belonging to a regulated
profession, are more than ever necessary in the complex business
world of today."3 1
Moreover, with elite firms stressing "their
internationalization,"3 2 their activities at a global level are likely to
have an impact on the domestic market for legal services. 33
A particular concern has been expressed about the concept of
"global lawyer" in international business and capital markets:
While it is sound from a business perspective, the concept carries
with it the danger of professional statelessness, a condition in which
lawyers over time become disassociated from the legal profession's
fundamental values, such as lawyer independence. Lawyering for a
global organization runs the risk of creating a new legal elite whose
commitment to this understanding [that the lawyer will help the legal
system remain the centrepiece of our fragile sense of community, help it
to function within our culture as the crucial mechanism for social
34
cohesion and stability] is at best tenuous, and, at worst, nonexistent.

Underpinning calls for global self-regulation there is a vision of the
lawyer's role founded on what are claimed to be the core values of the
legal profession and the "lore of lawyering. " 35 Recently, for example,

According to the former President of the American Bar Association, "Irlegulation of the
practice of law promotes the concept that a lawyer serves the public interest inaddition
to the client." Philip S. Anderson, Remarks, 18 DIcK. J. INY'L L. 43, 45 (1999).
According to Greer, "because of the attention focused on professional regulation by the
WTO and the OECD and the coming debate over MDPs, every aspect of the regulation
of our profession will be subject to intense examination and, in the end, w%*ill
have to be
justified, not by protectionist concerns, but by public interests, including the interests
of the increasing numbers of direct participants in the global economy.' Greer, supra
note 11, at 182-83.
29.
See, e.g., LAW WrrHouT FRONTIERS, supra note 3, at 234 (stating that
"[lawyers need to convince their actual and potential clients that their ethical rules are
not merely restrictive practices designed to bolster the competitive position of lawyers,
but essential and valuable safeguards to the modern client to and all others with whom
the lawyer comes into contact").
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Silver, supra note 8, at 1093.
33.
Id.
34.
Mary C. Daly, The Cultural,Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for
a Global Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L. J. 1057, 1111
(1997) [hereinafter The Role of the General Counsel] (quoting Timothy P. Terrell &
James HL Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism,"41 EMORY L. J. 403, 423 (1992)).
35.
L. Harold Levinson, CollaborationBetween Lauorers and Others: Coping
with the ABA Model Rules After Resolution IOF, 133 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 133, 137
(2001) (discussing In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985)).
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former ABA President Philip S. Anderson identified four "core
principles" on which he hoped there would be universal agreement. 30
First, "the practice of law is a learned profession." 37 It requires
specialized training and the "lawyer must gain an understanding of
the shared values of the profession."38 Second, a lawyer must be
independent. The "lawyer must zealously represent the client;"30
strict confidentiality must be maintained; and conflicts of interest
must be "avoided absolutely." 40 Third, lawyers must be regulated "to
ensure competence and ethical conduct."4 1 The "practice of law must
be governed by ethical principles." 42
Regulation "promotes the
concept that a lawyer serves the public interest in addition to the
client."43 Fourth, a "lawyer has an obligation to the public in addition
to obligations to a particular client, and a lawyer has a responsibility
to respect the concept of the rule of law."44 The "legal profession,
operating within the rule of law and a transparent system of justice,
strengthens the disparate institutions of the world's governments and
reenforces [sic] the fabric of society." 45
In a similar vein, Rupert Woolf, the current CCBE President,
stated that lawyers "[must] strive to maintain their share of the
market," but "[alt the same time we will need to defend the core
values of the profession, namely independence, autonomy, selfregulation and respect for the rule of law." 46 These core values
"constitute fundamental rights of the citizens." 47 In short, the core
values of the legal profession, it is claimed, mean the "profession of
48
law is more than a job; it is a high calling."
What is significant about global self-regulation is the belief that
the core values should be replicated at an international level. 49
According to the CCBE, despite their diversity in different countries,
which make their professional rules "inherently incapable" of

36.
Anderson, supra note 28, at 44.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Id. at 45.
44.
Id. at 44.
45.
Id. at 45.
46.
Rupert Wolff, A Message from the CCBE President, 1 CCBE GAZETTE 1
(Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union) (2001).
47.
Id.
48.
Anderson, supra note 28, at 45.
49.
There is also a hope that they can be preserved at domestic level. See
generally, Preserving the Core Values of the American Legal Profession: The Place of
Multidisciplinary Practice on the Law Governing Lawyers, MacCrate Report (2000)
(reporting on preserving core legal values in the face of changing legal markets and
increasing globalization).
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"[general] application," "nevertheless are based on the same values
and in most cases demonstrate a common foundation."5 0
Similar values can be seen in U.S. codes, despite differences in
the details of the rules. 51 The preamble to the ABA Model Rules sets
out: "A Lawyer's Responsibilities." It declares: "A lawyer is a
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public
2
citizen having special responsibility[ies] for the quality of justice."3
Later, it states, "Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from
conflict" between these three responsibilities.5 3 "Such issues must be
resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral
judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules [of
Professional Conduct]." 4
The core values of the profession, it is asserted, should transcend
the context of legal practice. 55 In relation to multidisciplinary
partnerships, for example, which might exist at either national or
international levels, an ABA Commission recommended that, in its
proposed annual certification, the MDP must acknowledge that it will
"respect the unique role of the lawyer in society as an officer of the
legal system, a representative of clients and a public citizen having
special responsibility for the administration of justice."5 6
The CCBE Code strongly endorses this view. In its preamble it
sets out "[the function of the lawyer in society:"
In a society founded on respect for the rule of law the lawyer fulfils

a special role. His duties do not begin and end with the faithful
performance of what he is instructed to do so far as the law permits. A
lawyer must serve the interests ofjustice as well as those whose rights
and liberties he is trusted to assert and defend and it is his duty not
only to plead his client's cause but to be his adviser.
A lawyer's function therefore lays on him a variety of legal and
moral obligations (sometimes appearing to be in conflict with each
other) towards:
-the client;
-the courts and other authorities before whom the lawyer pleads his
client's cause or acts on his behalf;

50.

CUBE CODE, supra note 3,

51.

See Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the European Community's Legal

1.2.2.

Ethics Code PartI: An Analysis of the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1, 45-59 (1993).
52.
MODEL RULES, supra note 5, prmbl. 1 1 (analyzing differences in the
substance of the MODEL RULES and the CCBE CODE and how they indicate different
ideas about the role of the attorney).

53.

Id. prmbl.

8.

54.
Id. prmbL 12.
55.
Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of
PurchasingLegal Services from Lawyers in a MultidisciplinaryPartnership,13 GEO. J.

LEGAL ETHiCS 217, 278-79 (2000) at 278-79.
56.

Id.
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-the legal profession in general and each fellow member of it in
particular;
-the public for whom the existence of a free and independent
profession, bound together by respect for rules made by the profession
itself, is an essential means of safeguarding human rights in face of the
57
power of the state and other interests in society.

At both domestic and international levels, therefore, one can find
clearly expressed assertions of fundamental principles about the
unique role of the lawyer. There is a perceived need to identify and
preserve core values whatever the environment of legal practice. 58
The claim is that some characteristics of the practice of law are
universal.5 9 There are "certain unifying principles and standards
and a method of their implementation to foster and encourage
transnational practice." 60 As a result, it is possible to define a "global
profession." 61 The advantages of agreeing on "the contours of the
legal profession with the shared values" are spectacular: Lawyers
"can do more to ensure continued peace, productive commerce and
62
enduring harmony in this world than all the armies of history."
The rhetoric of global regulation is full of references to
fundamental human rights, the rule of law, due process, the
independence of the lawyer and judge, and the role of the lawyer
within the legal system. Self-regulation and professionalism in
global legal practice, founded on the core values of the legal
profession, are promoted as being in the public interest. Professional
codes are there to establish and maintain high standards to protect
the public and to encourage lawyers to "do the right thing." It is thus
"in the Public Interest to preserve the core values of the legal
63
profession."
Nevertheless, is the aspiration to deliver the core values at the
level of global law practice realistic? Is it desirable and, if so, for
whom?
Drawing on a range of Anglo-American research and
scholarship this Article addresses these questions by contrasting the
rhetoric of global self-regulation with the reality of global law
practice.

57.

CCBE CODE, supra note 3, pmbl. 1 1.1.

58.
See STEVEN C. NELSON, Introduction to RIGHTS, LIABILITY AND ETHICS IN
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 3, at xviii.

59.
Anderson, supra note 28, at 43.
60.
Id. at 45.
61.
Id. at 43.
62.
Id. at 45.
63.
Anti-MDP resolution to the ABA House of Delegates, July 2000, quoted in
Harrison in the work cited n. 65.
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II. GLOBAL LAW PRACnCE-RHETORIC AND REALITY
Independence-of the legal profession and of the lawyer-lies at
the heart of legal professionalism at both national and international
levels. According to the CCBE, an independent legal profession "is an
essential means of safeguarding human rights in face of the power of
According to the ABA
the state and other interests in society."6
Model Rules, it is "an important force in preserving government
under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by
a profession whose members are not dependent on the government
65
for the right to practice."
Both the Model Rules and the CCBE Code acknowledge that a
lawyer's core duties-to client, court, profession, and public--can
conflict.66 As a result, a lawyer's "absolute independence, free from
all other influence, especially such as may arise from his personal
interests or external pressure" is required; it "is as necessary ... in
the process of justice as the impartiality of the judge."67 In order to
resolve potential conflicts, the lawyer should exercise independent
professional judgment free from undue influence from the client.68
How far does this vision of the independent lawyer accord with
the reality of global law practice? Does the power of the state, vis-avis the client, pose a threat; are global lawyers needed to protect
global clients? To what extent are global lawyers likely to exercise
independent professional judgment in the public interest? Does
global law practice preserve government under law or does it
undermine the rule of law?
A. Power
While globalization has increased the power of global law firm
clients, it has undermined the power of nation states. States'
regulatory power and authority have been put under pressure from a
variety of sources: "from neoconservative ideologues, despairing
social democrats and deluded populists; from powerful corporations
which have created transnational markets and world-wide
manufacturing and sourcing strategies; from communications and
transportation technologies which can move ideas, goods, money and
people across national boundaries with relative ease and great

64.
65.
66.
67.

CCBE CODE, supra note 3, prmbl. 1 1.1.
MODEL RULES, supranote 5, prmbl. 9 10.
Id- at prmbl. 918; CCBE CODE, supra note 3, prmbl. J 1.1.
CCBE CODE, supra note 3, T 2.1.1.

68.

See MODEL RULES, supranote 5, prmbl. T 8.

942

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:931

speed."69 States have also been directly challenged by global law firm
clients.
The clients most sought-after by global law firms are very
powerful, the repeat players in the international economy: the
investment and commercial banks that structure financial
transactions, 70 multinational corporations, and insurance companies.
These clients can by-pass or resist states:
"The essential
characteristic of a global organization is that it has divorced markets
71
from nation-states."
Some clients indeed may be more powerful than state in which
they do business. The capital value of the largest-multinational
corporations and banks exceeds the GDP of some nation states.
Exxon, the largest corporation in 2001, had assets of $149 billion,
revenues of over $210 billion and profits in excess of seventeen billion
dollars; Toyota, the 250th largest, had over seven billion dollars,
nineteen billion dollars and seventy-three
million dollars
72
respectively.
Transnational corporations "are responsible for increases in
foreign investment and cultural concentration." 73
As a result,
"[clorporate power now undeniably challenges governments.
Business can hold countries to ransom over investment regimes and
deregulation of labour markets. Transnationals can manipulate
markets, exploit subsidies or simply relocate if things get bad."'7 4
Global law firm clients are sophisticated and well-informed. Most
have in-house legal departments to provide legal advice and
representation and to monitor the performance of private law firms.
In short, the relationship between the clients of global law firms
and the state is very different from the typical one envisaged by
professional codes. Transactions are likely to be very large scale
financially and in terms of the law firm resources devoted to them.
As one partner in Allen & Overy, a major U.K. law firm, put it: "[W]e
are only interested in clients that can afford us." 75 And global law
firms' revenues reveal the fruits of their work. At the end of 2000,
the single largest turnover ever in legal history-almost £1 billion-

69.

H. W. Arthurs, A Global Code of Legal Ethics for the TransnationalLegal

Field, 2 LEGAL ETHIcs 59, 61 (1999).
70.
See Carole Silver, supra note 8, at 1132 (2000).
71.
Daly, supra note 5, at 1111.
72.
2001 Global 5 Hundred, The World's Largest Corporations, FORTUNE 500,
July 23, 2001, at F-1, F-5.
73.
War on Want, "The global divide: globalisation, work and world poverty,"
quoted in K.D. EWING AND TOM SIBLEY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION RIGHTS FOR THE
NEW MILLENNIUM 15 (2000).

74.
75.

Id.
EUROPEAN COUNSEL, Mar. 1998, at 28.
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was reported by Clifford Chance. 76 In the same year, the gross
revenues of Skadden Arps were just over, and of Baker & McKenzie
77
just under, one billion dollars.
B. Independent ProfessionalJudgment
The core values of the legal profession emphasize that a lawyer's
duty to the client may be tempered in the interests of third parties,
the courts, and society at large. 78 Independent professional judgment
is needed to ensure that the lawyer is free from undue influence from
the client and able to resolve potential ethical conflicts. In practice,
though, lawyers may approach such conflicts in a more
straightforward way.
In the United States, for example, a "libertarian" ideology 79 is
said to predominate: the "image of the adversarial advocate who
places [the] client's cause above every other consideration."8 0 As
Terry succinctly puts it: "Most United States lawyers probably would
assert that their professional obligation is to please their clients."81
According to Robert W. Gordon:
[There has been an] uncontrolled expansion of libertarian ideology
into lawyers' common consciousness-to the point where lawyers have
come to feel genuinely affronted and indignant when any authority tries
to articulate a public obligation of lawyers that may end up putting
them at odds with clients. We have no public obligations, they claim;
we are private agents for private parties...; our loyalties to clients

must be absolute and undivided.

82

This ideology "privatizes the lawyer's role"83 and undermines the
"norm that part of the lawyer's role is to represent the public
purposes of the legal system to the client, as well as the client to the
legal system .
."84 If there is a conflict between the client and, for
example, the justice system, the client's interest predominates. The

76.

The

Lawyer.com

reported

a

turnover

£937

of

million,

at

http://www.thelawyer.comILawyerNewsfrop100/firms-toptable.asp.
by Location, at
httpJ/vvw.law.comi
77.
Law.con
Gross Revenue
special/professionalslamlaw/amlawl00/00lgross.html.
See, e.g, MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at EC 7-39, DR 1-102(A)(5), Canon 8;
78.
MODEL RULES, supranote 5, at R. 8.4(d).
79.
See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29; William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in
Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083, 1085 (1988).
80.

Andrew Boon & Jennifer Levin, THE ETHICS AND CONDLUCT OF LAWYERS IN

ENGLAND AND WALES 107 (1999).
81.
Terry, supranote 51, at 46.
82.
Robert W. Gordon, A Collective Failure of Nerve:
Kaye Scholer, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 315, 320 (1998).
83.
Id. at 321.
84.
Id. at 320-21.
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Model Code reconciles this perspective: "The duty of the lawyer to
his client and his duty to the legal system are the 5same: to represent
8
his client zealously within the bounds of the law."
"The
The libertarian ideology has practical implications:
American legal profession's endorsement of the lawyer's duty of
zealous advocacy-as opposed to her duty to serve as an 'officer of the
court'-encourages a more entrepreneurial form of legal practice than
prevails in Europe."8 6 Although this ideology operates to a lesser
extent within England,8 7 it is this ideology that is being exported by
both U.S. and U.K. global law firms.
Global law firms operate in highly competitive markets,
competing with each other and with "Big 5" accounting and
professional service firms. It is not surprising that firms which serve
corporations and banks have a strong commercial-entrepreneurial
ethos.8 8 In such markets, duties to the system, to the court, and to
third parties inevitably become marginalised.8 9 The very notion of
lawyer independence thus "rings somewhat hollow in today's practice
environment in which law firm partners focus closely on bottom line
profitability, implement corporate-like organizational structures, and
reward rainmaking more than legal skills."90
In a guide to clients on the American legal network in London,
U.S. lawyers were described-by some British lawyers-as
"chameleons," emulating their clients, rather than as "owls," wise,
detached, and independent, like traditional professionals would be
viewed. 9 1 British law firms have their chameleons too; at least, that
is how some U.K. large firm lawyers are apparently encouraged to
view themselves: "Chameleons fit in.
Chameleons get on.
92
Chameleons do not get sacked."
In the United States, the culture of the mega law firm has been
described as "Cravathis[t]:" "an Anglo-American model of corporate
legal practice, [of] professionalism and private governance and,

85.

MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1983).

86.

Robert A. Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary

Inquiry, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 38 (1994).
87.
Christopher J. Whelan, Ethical Conflicts in Legal Practice: Creating
ProfessionalResponsibility, 52 S.C. L. REV. 697, 715-16 (2001).
88.
See G. Hanlon, A Profession in Transition?-Lawyers, The Market and
Significant Others, 60 MOD. L. REV. 798, 802-03 (1997).
89.
Boon & Levin, supra note 83, at 80.
90.
Daly, supra note 55, at 271.
91.
Lucinda Kemeny, American Lawyers Swoop on London, THE SUNDAY TIMES
(London), Feb. 25, 2001, (Business), at 3 (citing a survey by Baker Tilly, titled "Yanks a
Million").
92.
Jane Smith (pseudonym), A Brave New World that Poisoned an Office
Culture, THE TIMES (London), May 8, 2001, (Law) at 7.
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ultimately, of capitalism." 93 Pioneered by Paul Cravath in the
nineteenth century, it is multipurpose and commercially oriented. 94
One large City of London law firm lawyer:
[Witnessed an increasingly slick ...

PR and marketing machine wvith

very clear goals-to dominate the chosen markets for legal services,
strategically expand the firm and push profits. The future belonged to

those who could rise to the challenge of globalisation. The competition
would be fierce and only those with the right stuff would succeed. The
95
goal-to be the world's premier law firmn

This image of the lawyer and law firm behavior is the very
antithesis of the exercise of independent professional judgment.
Individual lawyers working in such firms are under enormous
pressure to conform to the law firm culture. Thus, it is not only
libertarian ideology that is being exported, but a particular kind of
law firm culture.
In short, "[c]ompetition puts loyalty to clients at a premium."96
It would be professional suicide for a global firm lawyer to exercise
independent professional judgment at the expense of the client's
perceived best interests. The CCBE Code, however, after its revision
in 1998, has reinforced the duty of loyalty. It added the words "and
fearlessly" to its original formula: A lawyer must "defend clients
interests honorably and fearlessly without regard to his own interests
97
or to any consequences to himself or to any other person."
It has been argued that a libertarian ideology represents a
s
slippery slope to excessive zeal and uncontrolled instrumentalism:
"It authorizes lawyers to advance novel legal claims and arguments,
challenging or stretching existing doctrines, and asserting that it is
the court's job, not the lawyer's to separate the wheat from the
chaff."99 At a global level, this has implications for the rule of law.

93.
H. V. Arthurs, supra note 71, at 68. See also, H. W. Arthurs & Robert
Kreklewich, Law, Legal Institutions, & the Legal Profession in the New Economy, 34
OSGOODE HALL L. J. 1 (1996).
94.
See, e.g., David Trubek et al., Global Restructuringand the Law: Studies of
the Internationalizationof Legal Fields and the Creationof TransnationalArenas, 44
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407, 423 (1994).
95.
Jane Smith (pseudonym), supra note 96, at 6.
96.
Boon & Levin, supra note 83, at 80.
97.
CCBE CODE, supra note 3, T 4.3 (emphasis added).
98.
David J. Luban, Milgram Revisited, in RESEARCHING LW: AN ABF
UPDATE (1998) 1, 9. See also, David J. Luban, The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, in
ETHICS IN PRACTICE:

LAWYERS'

ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES,

(Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000).

99.

Kagan, supra note 89, at 38.
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C. Rule ofLaw
According to the CCBE, the core values of the lawyer assume a
society "founded on respect for the rule of law."10 0 Similarly, the IBA
acknowledges the "universal principle" of "respect for the rule of
law."10 1 Societies or legal systems that are not founded on the rule of
law are encouraged to "reform," both by political movements in their
battle cry for democracy and by other states. The European Union,
for example, demands that Central and Eastern European countries
establish institutions guaranteeing the rule of law in order to join the
02
Union.'
In the context of global law practice, however, respect for the
rule of law may take an unexpected turn. Rule of law rhetoric can be
mobilized by private parties-and their legal advisers-not just to
curb the arbitrary exercise of power by the state and its agents, but to
challenge any exercise of power.' 03 Private parties can use rule of
law ideology not only to constrain abuse of state power-which may
be "good"-but to defeat regulation made by the state to protect and
04
further the public interest-which may be "bad."'
At the political level, rule of law rhetoric can be used to
denigrate the scope and potential effectiveness of proposed
regulation.' 0 5 If successful, regulation designed to strengthen the
framework for globalization and economic integration-to "ensure the
orderly and honest operation of capital markets, the protection of
intellectual property, predictable outcomes in credit transactions,
physical safety and security and compatible technologies"-can be
06
undermined.'
The rule of law can also be invoked at the level of legal practice.
Corporate lawyers can use the law to undermine the state via private
lawmaking' 07-creating law from the ground up, exploiting loopholes,
and pushing the limits of the law-and via creative compliance' I 8 complying with the letter of the law but defeating its spirit and
purpose. The problem is not that lawyers are implicated in white

100.
CCBE CODE, supra note 3, prmbl. I 1.1.
101.
Terry & Mahoney, supra note 6, at 7-16.
102.
European Commission, Background Report, B/2/97, The Enlargement of the
European Union, Feb. 1997.
103.
See Doreen McBarnet & Christopher Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law:
Formalism and the Struggle for Legal Control, 54 MOD. L. REV. 848, 857 (1991).
104.
See id.
105.
See id. at 871.
106.
H. W. Arthurs, A Global Code of Legal Ethics for the TransnationalLegal
Field, 2 LEGAL ETHICS 59, 61 (1999).
107.
Michael Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private
Lawmaking, 18 LAW AND SOC. INQUIRY 423, 423 (1993)
108.
McBarnet & Whelan, supra note 103, at 848.

2001]

ETHICS BEYOND THE HORIZON

collar crime, such as money laundering, which is clearly wrongI 0 9 but
in "whiter than white collar crime,"110 which is perfectly legal, or
1 11
arguably so.
One reason why Anglo-American law firms dominate the global
practice of law may be that maneuvers on topics such as mergers and
acquisitions, take-overs, and debt restructuring "had all been
developed first in the U.S. and British markets. As these sorts of
deals proliferated across the international economy, U.S. and British
12
firms found themselves with a natural, lucrative, niche."
Certainly, the creative use of law makes both law and lawyers more
valuable. It allows lawyers to participate in their clients' activities
when they otherwise would be excluded." 3 It also gives them a
competitive advantage based on legal creativity." i 4 No wonder City
of London solicitors see English law as "a product marketed by
English lawyers throughout the world . . . [and] that the primary
purpose of City lawyers in the international market is to sell English
5
law.""l

Legal creativity not only undermines the effectiveness of specific
regulations," 6 it also weakens the level playing field upon which the
framework for globalization and economic integration relies.1 7 Thus,

109.
See William W. Park, Anonymous Bank Accounts: Narco-Dollars, Fiscal
Fraudand Lawyers, in Daly & Goebel, supra note 58, at 331 (discussing lawyers' role
in money laundering, including assisting in the creation of corporations designed to add
a "screen of anonymity" between banker and client and opening bank accounts for
individuals whose true identities have not been disclosed by the financial institution).
Of course, lawyers might look to professional rules to protect them from organized
crime, for example. There is a view that the rules are ineffective in this regard and
obstruct professionals from taking action.
See, e.g. EUROPEAN PRLIAMEN
RESOLUTION TO COMBAT ORGANIZED CRIE, C 371/183, 1997 0. J. 40 (urging that
professional codes provide for immediate termination of contacts with clients and also
for legal means to approach authorities). See Steven R. Salbu, Battling Global
Competitionin the New Millennium, 31 LAXI & POL. INT'L BUS. 47 (1999).
110.
Doreen McBarnet, Whiter than White-Collar Crime: Tax, FraudInsurance
and the Management of Stigma, 42 BRIT. J. SOC. 3 (1991).
111.
DOREEN MCBARNET & CHRISTOPHER WHELAN, CREATIVE ACCOLUrING AND
THE CROSS-EYED JAVELIN THROWER (1999) [hereinafter CREATIVE ACCOUN'rINGI.
112.
Carol Silver, supra note 8, at 1098 (2000) (quoting Debora L. Spar, Lauwers
Abroad. The Internationalizationof Legal Practice,39 CAL. MGMT. REV. 8, 16 (1997)).
113.
Id. at 1098-99 (quoting Robert Nelson, The Futuresof American Lawyers. A
DemographicProfile of a ChangingProfession in a ChangingSociety, 44 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 344, 355-57 (1994)).
114.
DOREEN MCBAJNET & CHRISTOPHER J. WHELAN, INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE CHALLENGE OF CREATIVE COMPLIANCE (1992)
[hereinafter LNTERNATIONAL CORPORATE FINANCEI.
115.
Flood, supra note 6, at 191.
116.
CREATIVE ACCOUNTING, supra note 116.
117.
See generally INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 119. See
also Abel, TransnationalLaw Practice,supra note 6.
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8
if "[tihe key to humanising globalisation lies in regulating TNCs,""1
the key to resisting it may fall to global lawyers. As one partner in
the Paris office of Cleary Gottleib Steen & Hamilton concluded: "If
you really want to reduce the power of
the state, then you have to
9
increase the role of law and lawyers.""
It is also no wonder that "[tihe pervasiveness of government
regulation in the modern economy, the vast increase in the scope of
corporate enterprise and activities, and an era of relatively modest
regulatory enforcement have led to demands that lawyers be more
attentive to the social impact of their clients' activities." 120
Professional self-regulation is seen as insufficient. In the United
States, both the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Office
of Thrift Supervision have challenged lawyer and law firm behavior
in relation to corporate representation. 12 1 The OFT brought charges
alleging a law firm assumed the regulatory compliance and disclosure
duties of its federally insured thrift institution by interposing itself
122
between the client and the regulatory agency.
At an international level, however, external regulation of the
profession is more complex still. Globalization has created "forces
that even the ABA or the SEC are unable to combat." 123 Can any
kind of regulation withstand such forces? If globalization overrides
the rule of law, global lawyers are implicated in actions that are
contrary to the public interest and to the core values of the legal
profession. As one practitioner put it, "while lawyers are advising
their clients to obey the law, they are often finding ways to 'wink at'
or avoid complying with local practice rules which may be
unreasonable or arbitrary."124 The rhetoric of the core values adds
value to the client, but at the expense of the public interest.
In short, the rule of law rhetoric is particularly suspect for those
transnational lawyers who work against the "spirit" of the law in deal
making and advising:
"[F]ar from being means to the

implementation of rights ...lawyers create the devices which obviate

them and render them ineffective." 125 These business lawyering
methods "are transforming Europe's national legal fields and
revolutionizing the old European mode of production of law."' 2

118.
War on Want, supra note 76, at 15.
119.
Flood, supra note 6, at 191.
120.
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer,
13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 197, 204-05 (2000).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 206 n.51.
123.
Malpas, supra note 6, at 17.
124.
Greer, supra note 11, at 181.
125.
Doreen McBarnet, Law, Policy & Legal Avoidance: Can Law Effectively
Implement EgalitarianPolicies?, 15 J. L. & SoC'Y 113, 118-19 (1998).
126.
Trubek et al., supra note 98, at 426. In world terms there may be a 'race'
between the common law, civil law, and Islamic law cultures. See J. Flood, The
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Ill. CONCLUSION

Proponents of global professional regulation assert that core
values are necessary for global law practice. By contrast, this Article
suggests that the core values may not only be unnecessary, they may
legitimate behavior that is contrary to the public interest. In short,
they may be counterproductive.
That they are unnecessary is suggested by the experience of inhouse counsel. In-house counsel are excluded from the CCBE Code
because they are deemed to lack independence and identify too
closely with the client.'2 7 In Europe, therefore, a key group of global
lawyers "who represent exceedingly powerful multinational business
entities but lack professional identities associated with the rule of
law".12 are largely unregulated. 2 9 While this may be a matter of
concern to general counsel, for whom "the gaps . . . at the

international level present a major problem,"13 0 should it be so for the
public? Or does the lack of regulation simply reflect the realities of
13
such legal practice? '
Similar questions could be asked of global law firm lawyers. Do
they really need professional identities? Arguably, their function is
not dissimilar to in-house counsel. The more lawyers become
associated with economic forces in a competitive marketplace, the
harder it is for them to justify and to sustain professionalism.

Cultures of Globalisation: ProfessionalRestructuringfor the InternationalMarket, in
PROFESSIONAL COMPETrrION AND PROFESSIONAL POvER: LAWyERS, AccoLuNrANms AND
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF MARKETS (Y. Dezalay & D. Sugarman eds., 1995).
This view was endorsed by the European Court of Justice in Case 155/79,
127.
Australian Mining & Smelting Europe Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1982 E.C.R. 1575. The Court
recognized the existence of lawyer-client privilege as a matter of basic right derived
from the principles and concepts common to all Member States. Id. However, it
limited the privilege to communications emanating from "an independent lawyer...
based on the conception of the lawyer's role as collaborating in the administration of
justice by the courts and as being required to provide, in full independence, and in the
overriding interests of that cause, such legal assistance as the client needs." See Daly,
The Role of the General Counsel, supra note 34, at 1104.
128.
Daly, The Role ofthe General Counsel, supra note 34, at 1058.
129.
Note, however, that it has been reported that Belgium in 2000 has created
a new separate profession for 'in-house' lawyers, complete vith its own governing body.
EUROPEAN COUNSEL, Feb. 22, 2000.
Joseph Pratt, The Parameters of the Attorney-Client Privilege for In-House
130.
Counsel at the InternationalLeveL Protectingthe Company's Confidential Information,
20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 145, 147 (1999).
131.
Inside counsel in large American corporations, while they retain their
professional identities, emphasize their dedication to management objectives, and defer
to managements judgments about legal risk. Their entrepreneurial tendencies reflect
their efforts to "adapt their images and lawyoring styles to the prerogatives of
contemporary management." See Robert L. Nelson and Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops,
Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large
Corporations,34 LAW & SOcY REV. 457 (2000).
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Globalization, with the enormous development of industry and
commerce and with the corresponding increase in the complexity of
fields of law, means that the needs of business clients cannot be met
in the old, traditional way. Instead, there are law firms, with
thousands of people, with formal management structures, business
plans, recruiting, and promotional activities. As a result, one
practitioner asked: "Is this
the beginning of the end of the legal
132
profession as we know it?"
Globalization is an economic phenomenon. Its "driving idea...
is free-market capitalism," 133 and lawyers are the agents of
transnational economic actors. Maintaining professional privileges in
such a free for all environment is increasingly difficult. There may be
a place for business ethics in the international marketplace-or there
may not-but professional ethics appear surplus to requirements.
The former ABA President argued that lawyers could do more
good "than all the armies of history,"1 34 but we should not forget that
armies-and lawyers-can also do a lot of damage. In the balance
between nation states and global markets, the attitudes and actions
of investors in key financial centers such as Wall Street, Hong Kong,
London, and Frankfurt can have a huge impact: 'The United States
can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody's can destroy you by
downgrading your bonds. ' 135 In this sense, the rule of law has a
political value and globalization has moved the market theory of
136
professions from the national to the international sphere.
This does not mean that multinational practitioners and global
law firms are not concerned with professionalism. Indeed, they may
be very concerned with it-with core values, with professional
identity and status, and with professional standards. But why? In
an economic environment where the "level playing field" is stressedand much regulation is designed to create it-professionalism
provides an oasis where competitive forces are constrained. It is not
simply a case of higher standards to justify higher fees, but a case of
imposing standards that lawyers can meet and others cannot.
In the revised CCBE Code, the lawyer's obligation of
confidentiality has been strengthened and the information protected
expanded. Originally, the confidentiality to be respected related to
client-specific information-"given to [the lawyer] by his client, or

132.

LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note 3, at 234.

THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 8 (Rev. ed. 2000).
134.
Anderson, supra note 28, at 45.
135.
Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of FinancialMarkets? Two Thumbs
Down for the Credit-RatingAgencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 620 (1999), quoting The
News Hour With Jim Lehrer: Interview with Thomas L. Friedman (Feb. 13, 1996)
(transcript on file with Frank Partnoy).
136.
See LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITIcAL LIBERALISM (Terence C.
Halliday & Lucien Karpik, eds., 1997).
133.
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received by him about his client or others in the course of rendering
services to his clients." 137 Now it is much broader: "[All information
that becomes known to [the lawyer] in the course of his professional
138
activity."
In the original version, confidentiality was asserted to be the
"primary and fundamental right and duty of the lawyer." 139 In the
revised version, the assertion is explained: "[tihe Lawyer's obligation
of confidentiality serves the interest of the administration of justice
as well as the interest of the client. It is therefore entitled to special
40
protection by the State."
The rationale in the CCBE, as in domestic codes, is the need for
14
full and frank disclosure of information to the lawyer by the client. '
Under the revised rule, however, compromising information, whether
or not it was actually disclosed to the lawyer, and whether or not it
relates to the services the lawyer is rendering to the client, must be
kept confidential. 1'
This gives the lawyer no discretion to disclose
information in any circumstance, unlike, for example, the Model
Rules.
In any case, even at domestic level, the rhetoric of
oneis "expansive,
grandiose,
and
confidentiality-which
dimensional"-contrasts with the reality-which is "determinedly
43
multi-faceted, issue sensitive and policy responsive."
Abel argued that for lawyers not to observe confidentiality would
be "professional suicide." 4 4 The reinforcement of the rule in the
CCBE Code may make it easier for the cross-border lawyer to behave
in the public interest-according to the Code-and in the firm's
private interest: "[Clonfidentiality is one of the strongest market
145
advantages legal professionals possess."
The same goes for the core values more generally. It may be
instructive to note that in the United Kingdom, the legal profession
"advanced 'independence' as its core legitimation at the very moment
when that claim was increasingly compromised by the growing power
of both the state and large clients." 146 Other core values may also
serve this purpose.
The core values proposed for global law practice simply add
value to the private client, to the benefit of the transnational lawyer,
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rather than the public interest. Global clients and their lawyers may
want the benefit of the core values, but they do not need them. In the
global legal market, consumers of legal services can protect
themselves. While the rhetoric of global regulation focused our
attention on professional ethics, in practice, to the global lawyer,
professional ethics, if they exist at all, lie beyond the horizon.

